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Abstract 
 
This article contributes to the ongoing discussion on African aesthetics by presenting the concept 
of beauty or the beautiful as it evolved from cultural conceptions of beauty to the philosophical 
shift in the concept. It also examined the Western concept of beauty in order to show the 
different contexts of the meaning of beauty in African and Western philosophies with a primarily 
focus on beauty concepts in terms of what constitutes beauty and how beauty can be known. The 
presentation also shows that unlike individualistic conception of beauty in Western philosophy, 
the concept of beauty in African philosophy is relational and functional, and that in an African 
context, there is no beauty for beauty’s sake and that the beautiful is considered in terms of good 
conduct and physical attractiveness. Finally, it is argued that the African concept beauty is only 
intelligible when considered in the context of African ontology. 
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Dedication: This article is dedicated to my elder sister, Mrs. Udeme Mfon Udom nee Ibanga 
Francis, who died in May 2017 while I was revising the final draft of this article. May her gentle 
and beautiful soul rest in peace and bliss.  
 
 
Introduction 
 
According to Germaine Greer (1999), “every woman knows that, regardless of all her other 
achievements, she is a failure if she is not beautiful” (p.23). This sets the tone for this work, an 
investigation into conceptions of beauty, particularly in African philosophy and cultural thought. 
As Greer (1999) has noted the subject of beauty is critical to many people despite racial, cultural 
and gender boundaries.  
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In fact, much of humanity is perpetually in search of beauty and the beautiful. Christians and 
Muslims spend a large chuck of their time towards preparing for transition into a place called 
Heaven or paradise, which they describe as most beautiful. The bible describes paradise as a 
place that has streets paved with pure gold garnished with most sparkling metals and precious 
stones (Rev. 21:1-25). Buddhists and the Hindus, like Christians and Muslims, also spend much 
time preparing for a beautiful place (Lewis 1958). Heaven and paradise are described as a place 
of happiness and peace, induced by the beauty which surrounds or envelops the place. In modern 
history humanity has spent a lot of money in building palatial enclaves in pursuit of happiness 
that it induces. Beauty or the beautiful is an essential and luxurious commodity. This therefore is 
an indication that the subject of beauty is one of the most important aspects of human reality. 
However, despite universal pursuit of the beautiful, the concept of beauty is not universal; and is 
embedded in the cultural milieu of various communities. Therefore, this paper investigates 
beauty or the beautiful as it is conceptualized in African philosophy. 
 
 
Concept of the Beautiful in Western Philosophy: Plato, Aristotle, and Kant 
 
The search for the philosophical interpretation and significance of the beautiful is ancient. Even 
long before Thales began to set the path for Western philosophy, all cultures had already started 
their search for the beautiful. G. M. A. Grube (1927) observes that in Greek culture the word 
“beautiful” referred mainly to physical attractiveness that was anthropocentric. But the concept 
of beauty did not attract the attention of Western philosophers until Plato. Plato himself probably 
inherited philosophical discourse of beauty from Socrates, who was described as very ugly 
fellow. In his dialogues, Plato defines beauty or the beautiful as sublimate, a sublime muse, and 
harmonious juxtaposition of elements. Crispin Sartwell (2012) notes that in the Symposium Plato 
connect a beauty to a response of love and desire, even though he locates beauty in the realms of 
the Forms (an abstract property or quality transcendent to space and time); and he identifies the 
beauty of particular objects in their participation in the Form. Nickolas Pappas (2016) notes that 
in Plato’s dialogues “beauty... possesses the reality that Forms have and is discovered through 
the same dialectic that brings other Forms to light” (p.1). In this direction, beauty is objective in 
that it is a priori. Pappas (2016) further states that Plato also describes beauty as that which is 
“noble” and “admirable”; and not that Plato imply that beauty mean the same thing as virtue or 
good but more specifically that beauty facilitates the discovery of the good because “beautiful 
things strikes everyone and arouse everyone’s curiosity” (p.1).  In fact, for Plato “beautiful 
things remind souls of their mystery as no other visible objects do” (Pappas 2016, p.1).  
 
Another major philosopher who philosophized about the beautiful was Aristotle. He agreed with 
Plato that beauty is objective rather than subjective to individual experiences. However, he 
disagreed with Plato on what beauty is – basically because he rejected Plato’s theory of Forms of 
which Plato’s theory of beauty is embedded.  
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Contrary to the analysis and interpretation of many scholars, Aristotle’s concept of beauty is in 
the Metaphysics rather than in the Poetics. In the Metaphysics, Aristotle juxtaposed the concepts 
of the good and the beautiful wherefore he states that the good and the beautiful are the 
beginning both of knowledge and the movement of things. This is not to say that the good and 
the beautiful mean the same thing alternately but that they have a common root. This has to be 
understood in the light of his theory of Mean, which legislate proportionality and appropriateness 
for every right and just action (Aristotle 1996). Generally, Aristotle defines beauty in terms of 
appropriateness, symmetricality, exactity, and proportionality. In fact, in Aristotle’s own words 
“the greatest species of the beautiful are order, symmetry, and the definite” (Aristotle 1801, 
p.315). In the Topics, he provides the definition thus, “the beautiful is the appropriate”. John 
Marshall (1953) notes that, for Aristotle, beauty is cosmic, ontologic – which “in its highest 
form, it is fixed and eternal [and] the highest beauty is to be found in the heavens... [and] for him 
[Aristotle] the heavens do declare an eternal glory, and the earth is full of a resplendent beauty” 
(p.229). That is to say, Aristotle identifies beauty with nature; and set nature as a standard of the 
beautiful. As Marshall (1953) avers:  
 
Nature is characterized by the appropriate. In all nature the details [are] work 
out in such a way as to produce symmetry and proportion; and this is true not 
only of the heavens but of the sub-lunar worlds as well... Nature is the master 
artist. It is nature which creates beauty par excellence... Because of the 
essential beauty of nature, we learn to create beautiful objects by imitating the 
beauty of nature... Nature is the master of the appropriate; and we learn the 
appropriate by following the guiding hand of our master craftsman (p.229). 
 
 
In the two accounts above, it is evident that early Greek philosophy held beauty to be objective, 
exact, definite, appropriate, and eternal. Moreover, it conceptualized beauty as metaphysical and 
cosmic. This was contrariwise to the conceptions of beauty in Greek culture which was primarily 
physical attractiveness that embedded in an anthropocentric framework that saw nature as merely 
serving to project the beauty of people. Therefore, the metaphysics of Plato and Aristotle was an 
effort to encode beauty in morality which of course had cosmic foundations in their philosophies. 
This view definitely influenced the philosophies of Plotinus, St. Augustine, and St. Aquinas, 
Avicenna, Al Ghazzali, and Al Farrabi who used it to justify their escapist philosophy, whereby 
heaven was created as a beautiful place where people could escape from the vagaries and 
elements of the world. The difference between Plato and Aristotle is that while Plato saw beauty 
as sort of Form existing only in the suprasensible world, Aristotle saw it as a Form that expresses 
itself in eternal nature open to the senses; but for both, beauty is objective.  
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Another major Western philosopher who philosophized about the concept of beauty or the 
beautiful is Immanuel Kant. His philosophy of the beautiful is represented mainly in his Critique 
of Aesthetic Judgment. Kant (1987) defines beauty thus: “beautiful is what, without a concept, is 
liked universally” (p.220). This implies that beauty has to be universally communicable. That is 
to say, what is judged as beautiful should be universalized; such that “in making a judgment of 
beauty about an object, one takes it that everyone else who perceives the object ought also to 
judge it to be beautiful, and, relatedly, to share one's pleasure in it” (Ginsborg 2013, p.1). This 
approach bears directly on Kant’s Categorical Imperative which implies universability for every 
judgment. However, the universability of the judgment of beauty is not objective as it is for any 
cognitive reasoning. In striving towards “universal communicability” in the judgment of 
beautiful, there is no set of principles to subsume ones aesthetic judgment for universal validity. 
That is what he mean by the definition “beautiful is what, without a concept, is liked universally” 
(Kant 1987, p.220). One’s universalization of aesthetic judgment is purely subjective. Kant 
(1987) maintains that one does not need to justify his idea of beauty against a backdrop of a 
concept or principle; “for beauty is not a concept of an object, and a judgment of taste is not a 
cognitive judgment” (p.291). In other words, judgment of beauty is not scientific but artistic; you 
cannot determine the beautiful by applying predetermined scientific principles or its method. 
Kant (1987) argues that:  
 
There can be no objective rule of taste, no rule of taste that determines by 
concepts what is beautiful. ...If we search for a principle of taste that states the 
universal criterion of the beautiful by means of determinate concepts, then we 
engage in a fruitless endeavor, because we search for something that is 
impossible and intrinsically contradictory (p.232). 
 
 
That statement directly rails against Aristotle’s scientific determining of beauty in terms of 
geometric principles. Kant (1987) holds that all that is needed to assert the universal validity of 
aesthetic judgment is “that we are justified in presupposing universally in all people the same 
subjective conditions of the power of judgment that we find in ourselves; ...[and] that we have 
subsumed the given object correctly under these conditions” (p.291). Hannah Ginsborg (2013) 
rightly notes, “it follows from this that judgments of beauty cannot, despite their universal 
validity, be proved: there are no rules by which someone can be compelled to judge that 
something is beautiful” (p.1). Kant (1987) distinguishes between different kinds of beauty or 
beautiful, namely: “free” or “vague” beauty and “accessory” or “fixed” beauty. Free beauty does 
not presuppose principles of evaluation whereas accessory beauty does presuppose a concept by 
which it is determined. Hence,  
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There are two kinds of beauty, free beauty (pulchritudo vaga) and merely 
accessory beauty (pulchritudo adhaerens). Free beauty does not presuppose 
a concept of what the object is [meant] to be. Accessory beauty does 
presuppose such a concept as well as the object's perfection in terms of that 
concept. The free kinds of beauty are called (self-subsistent) beauties of this 
or that thing. The other kind of beauty is accessory to a concept (i.e., it is 
conditioned beauty) and as such is attributed to objects that fall under the 
concept of a particular purpose (Kant 1987, p.230). 
 
 
He makes referents of nature or natural objects such as flowers and birds as examples of free 
beauty. He maintains that when we judge free beauty our judgment is pure and free of interests. 
He argues that it is the interests we attach to object of beauty that corrupt our judgment of the 
beautiful (Kant 1987, p.204-205). Kant argues that the aesthetic judgment of objects with 
intrinsic teleos cannot be pure. He states that “a judgment of taste about an object that has a 
determinate intrinsic purpose would be pure only if the judging person either had no concept of 
this purpose, or if he abstracted from it in making his judgment” (Kant 1987, p.231). This is 
impossible since purposive objects are intrinsically determinate. Kant gives examples of objects 
of accessory beauty to include at least human beings, house, armoury, church, mosque, palace, 
etc. The aforementioned “does presuppose the concept of the purpose that determines what the 
thing is [meant] to be, and hence a concept of its perfection, and so it is merely adherent beauty” 
(Kant 1987, p.230). Aesthetic judgments about free beauty are pure; those about fixed beauty are 
applied judgments of the beautiful and are partly conceptual. Kant (1987) maintains that in 
thinking beauty we are engaging in “a judgment that rests on subjective bases, and whose 
determining basis cannot be a concept and hence also cannot be the concept of a determinate 
purpose; [therefore] in thinking of beauty... we are not at all thinking of a perfection in the 
object” (p.228). Generally, Kant argues that judging beauty as good or otherwise does render 
such aesthetic judgment impure.  
 
Now just as a connection of beauty, which properly concerns only form, with 
the agreeable (the sensation) prevented the judgment of taste from being pure, 
so does a connection of beauty with the good (i.e., as to how, in terms of the 
thing's purpose, the manifold is good for the thing itself) impair the purity of a 
judgment of taste (Kant 1987, p.230). 
 
 
According to Henry Allison (2001), the Kant discourse on aesthetic judgment does contribute to 
the development of morality (p.219). He avers that, for Kant, “the existence of beautiful objects 
is a function of our underlying interest in universal communicability, which, in turn, is derived 
from our propensity to society or sociability” (Allison 2001, p.224).  
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Indeed, Kant (1987) himself seems to intone his moral metaphysics with a language reminiscent 
of the ‘duty’, thus: “regard for universal communicability as something that everyone expects 
and demands from everyone else, on the basis, as it were, of an original contract dictated by [our] 
very humanity” (p.297). This implies that universal communicability of the beautiful aims “to 
connect taste with an interest capable of yielding the grounds for a duty” (Allison 2001, p.224). 
Kant maintains that “to take a direct interest in the beauty of nature... is always a mark of a good 
soul; and that, if this interest is habitual, if it readily associates itself with the contemplation of 
nature, this indicates at least a mental attunement [Gemüthsstimmung] favorable to moral 
feeling” (p.298 – 299). Therefore, Kant’s notion of the beautiful, particularly as it relates to 
objects of accessory beauty, is a moral relevant category; even though its moral relevance is 
marginal and indirect. This point, to this extent, links Kant to Plato in terms of their definition of 
the beautiful as moral outpost.  
 
 
Notion of the Beautiful in African Philosophy 
 
The philosophy of beauty or philosophy of the beautiful is a developing discourse in African 
philosophy. This does not imply that there was no African conception of beauty. Rather, African 
philosophers are now beginning to earnestly have more than a passing and non-technical interest 
in the reality of the beautiful. In the context of African cultures, the concept of beauty or 
beautiful is indeed unique. In Africa, beauty is generally associated with women. In a 
sociological field study conducted by Arden Haselmann (2014) in Senegal, some of the male 
participants associated beauty with women. African conceptualizations of beauty are in feminine 
terms; and perhaps every usage of the word “beauty” or “beautiful” is usually constructed to 
celebrate womanhood or feminine spirit. Beauty connotes celebration of worth, value, quality, 
essence, and desirability. Hence, the concept of beauty in Africa is quite broad, and varies from 
one cultural community to another. However, as Vimbai Matiza (2013) rightly observes, the 
concept of beautiful in Africa tends to bespeak of external and internal qualities of a person or 
object. Moreover, the concept of beautiful in Africa bears some moral intonations beyond teleos. 
For example, Matiza (2013) notes that in the language of Shona in Zimbabwe; the word 
“kunaka” (beauty) denotes well-groomed character and physical attractiveness. In Annang of 
Nigeria (native to this author), the word “ntuen-akpo” is used metaphorically to refer to a woman 
who only has physical attractiveness, but lack good manners.  
 
Ntuen-akpo is a type of attractive pepper that can hurt the tongue when tasted or eaten. A woman 
described as ntuen-akpo is usually avoided, despised and not desired or valued despite her 
sparkling physical beauty.  
 
On the other hand, a woman who is rich in terms of good manners but lack in physical 
attractiveness is not often desired by the le crème of the society; and despite her good 
behaviours, if she attends a function she is given a relegated place away from public glare.  
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That is the reason such a woman who is given in inner beauty (uyai esit idem) but lack in 
exterior beauty (uyai akpọ iso) would pad up her body with accessories and oils in order to 
appear to have a complete beauty. Such act is described as “esin udua k’ iso”, beauty 
enhancement. By padding up her body it is believed she is will earn upward review of her value 
in terms of beauty judgment. Therefore, as we can see, in Africa, beauty is defined as unison (or 
harmony) of physical attractiveness (uyai akpọ iso) and good conducts (uyai edu) – this is to the 
extent that it applies to people. From a sociological field study conducted by Haselmann (2014) 
in Senegal, he abstracted from the responses of the participants that “inner and other beauty were 
described as being not mutually exclusive” (p.11). Matiza (2013) also notes thus, “in the African 
contexts there are two ways about it, there is the internal beauty which is usually seen through 
someone’s deeds and the external beauty of which is seen by physical eyes” (p.63). A person can 
therefore be said to lack in beauty if they lack one of the halves that constitute the beautiful. 
 
Another thing that characterizes the beautiful in African philosophy is functionality. Matiza 
(2013) avers that in African context “beauty is not for the sake of being beautiful” (p.65). 
Beauty, according to him, has social character; rather than being individualistic, it is communal. 
Matiza (2013) argues that “from African perspective, the concept of beauty has to have a purpose 
which it fulfils” (p.63). Beauty must serve to communicate values, norms, morals, and purpose. 
Beauty must edify the community. Baqie Muhammad (1993), in investigating the concept of 
beauty among the Sudanese, came to the following conclusion, that beauty is found in “good 
behaviour, skills, knowledge, dress” as well as in “physical features” (p.50). There cannot be 
beauty for its own sake; beauty must be intended to serve society. Matiza (2013) argues that the 
kind of beauty of which a person or thing intended to achieve as beauty to its own self alone 
without considering the sensitivities of others in the community is un-African. He maintains that 
beauty in an African context implies working together. That is to say, beauty must reflect the 
communalistic nature of African societies. Polycarp Ikuenobe (2016) avers that in Africa “a 
person or a thing is considered good, and thus, beautiful, if directed toward achieving or 
enhancing harmony and order in reality of which the community, people, and things are a part” 
(p.134). Beauty of a person or thing should be participatory and interconnective rather than 
individualistic; and should be meaningful only in the context of the acceptable standards of the 
community. Ikuenobe (2016) notes that if a person’s action is seen as “fostering or leading to 
disharmony in nature, community, and reality, then it is considered bad or ugly” (p.144). The 
Ubuntu dictum states: I am because we are. What this means is that a person’s beauty should 
communicate universability. To this extent, the concept of beauty in Africa is objective in that it 
communicates a communal standard, but it is also subjective in that the standard of beauty is 
different from community to community. I am beautiful because my community members affirm 
my beauty as such, but outside my community the affirmed beauty may be disavowed. What is 
considered beautiful is meaningful only to the people in that context. 
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Art Beauty and Personal Beauty 
 
The two graphs below represent beauty in a person and in an art object. Figure 1.0 shows 
ontological progression of person’s beauty; which is different from that of object in Figure 2.0. 
Figure 1.0 indicates that beauty-in-person progresses directly proportional to a person’s age in a 
positive direction until middle age, and progresses inversely proportional to a person’s age as 
he/she gets older. In other words, a person gets more beautiful as he/she grows older from birth. 
However, beauty-in-person declines or deteriorates when the individual get to the peak of the 
prime of his/her age; and declines further as he/she gets older. The peak of the prime of a person 
age is middle age which range from 50 to 55 years in male and 45 to 50 years in female. Once a 
person passed the middle age, beauty-in-person starts to diminish. Figure 2.0 shows beauty-in-
object progresses directly proportional to an object’s age in a negative direction. That is to say, 
that an art object gets uglier as it gets older in age; except perhaps when care attention is 
continually given upon such object. An art object attains the peak of beauty at the point of 
complete creation. But the beauty-in-object starts to decline from that point it is fully crafted, all 
things being equal, until the beauty wears itself out in the object. It is noteworthy that beauty-in-
person and beauty-in-art can be amended in upward direction. However, beauty-in-art cannot be 
amended to attain the prime stage which it was when the moment it was definitely created; and 
beauty-in-person, once it passed its prime, cannot be amended to be like the state it were before 
its prime. 
 
 
Figure 1.0: Ontological progression of beauty-in-person 
          
              Peak 
 
 
 
 
                  
               O 
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Figure 2.0: Progression of beauty-in-object 
     Original beauty state (Peak) 
 
      
  
 
 
 
   O    
 
What we can get from the fore-going is that beauty in neither eternal nor immutable whether in 
person or in object. That is to say, beauty is time dependent. The beautiful is always subject to 
depreciation. Since beauty is a form of art, it means beauty can be perfected by external agency 
independent of the object of beauty; or by immediate agency in the case of beauty-in-person.   
 
  
Relational Theory of Beauty 
 
Relational concept of beauty is an Afrocentric theoretical perspective that objects derives their 
beauty from other objects proximate to it. Other objects are the source of beauty in another 
object. As the saying goes “a tree does not make a forest beautiful”; without other objects an 
individual object cannot be said to be beautiful in a meaningful sense. For example, without the 
moon and stars sparkling objects at night cannot be that sparkling. Plants and animals are radiant 
because there is the sun and other objects, for example, to contribute to its radiance, etc. In fact, 
it is only in comparing oneself to the other that one come to appreciate personal beauty in terms 
of its gradient and meaning. The other individual mirrors the beauty of the person either 
negatively or positively. An object is considered beautiful to the extent that it co-relates and 
inter-relates with other objects within the cultural axiom it belongs. Without the other, a person 
or object cannot affirm its beauty.  
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The general concept for Afrocentric relational theory is “I am because we are”. This means that 
persons, objects, phenomena and concepts do not exist alone, individuated and isolated; rather 
they exist in relation with other persons, objects, phenomena and concepts. An Igbo Proverb 
states, “Ife kwulu, ife akwudebeya”, if one stands, another thing stands by it. One of the African 
philosophical theories that best explains this ontological experience is called Ibuanyidanda, a 
theory of being developed by Innocent Asouzu, based essentially on Igbo metaphysics. The most 
essential proposition of Ibuanyidanda (which is also reflected by other African ontological 
theories) is that being exist as a cohort or cluster. This is captured in the statement: “to be is to be 
in mutual complementary relationship (ka so mu adina) and its negation is to be alone (ka so mu 
di)” (Asouzu 2011, p.42). Deriving from this, Asouzu renders a normative account of his theory 
thus: that things do not only exist as cohort or cluster, but they equally exist to complement each 
other – hence, they are fragments of the whole (Asouzu 2007, p.267).  
 
The most important concept in Ibuanyidanda literature is “missing links”. Asouzu posits that 
“anything that exists serves a missing links of reality”; that no existent can uphold its being 
solely on its own but “can do this only with reference to the whole and in complementary 
harmony with other missing links” (Asouzu 2007, p.268). This means that an object serves to 
announce other possible objects in the horizon. It is for this reason, Asouzu argues that “there is 
need to consider the diverse units that are involved in any given context, not only with regard to 
their historical conditions” (Asouzu 2007, 121). This is important, given that being always 
manifests itself in relation with other beings. The lesson in the Ibuanyidanda approach to the 
study of phenomenon is that no existent can be individuated without taking into account the 
correlative objects it relates to. That is, object is never individuated rather it is interconnective 
with other objects in the horizon. To fully understand an object, therefore grasp its essence, it 
requires that an individual study it in relation with the correlative objects to which it 
interconnects and complements or appear together. 
 
On the basis of this, for one to grasp the aesthetical essence of objects he/she has to analyze it not 
in isolation to other objects or as isolated individuated object, but as “object-with-objects”, in 
relations with other objects it complements or that coexist with it in the overall framework of the 
horizon that projects it. It is in judging beauty this way that one can grasp the truth or 
comprehensive meaning about beauty. In the African philosophy, objects are seen as an 
interdependent whole in order to manifest their aesthetics values; and it is only in this manner 
that the aesthetic value of a person or an object can be realized. The life forms and art objects, 
taken individually, do not manifest their aesthetical value as it should. Experience of beauty has 
to do with wholeness and interdependence; and recognizing one’s place in the connective web of 
other existents. In Africa, the term “beauty” is used in a communal/communitarian sense. Beauty 
involves feeling of a complexity of relations and complementarity, rather than a feeling of 
opposites and isolation.  
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Beautiful implies self-realization in communal sense, that is, the tendency to want to flourish and 
realize oneself in harmony with other existents. Relational theory of beauty holds that beauty is a 
category that belongs to the definition or basic constitution of the relations between two or more 
persons/objects considered as complementary whole, so that without the relation, persons and 
objects lose their individual sense of beauty.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This study examined the concept of beauty or the beautiful in African philosophy. It indicated 
that the concept of beauty in an African context is communal and functional, unlike 
individualistic conception of beauty in Western philosophy. Hence, the communal conception of 
beauty means that whatever is judged as beautiful must not be socially disharmonious, but it 
must also enhance community balance. The functional conception of beauty implies that beauty, 
in an African context must serve to lead to some purpose. In Africa, beauty is linked with the 
development of moral awareness; there is no beauty for beauty’s sake, it must serve some good. 
Finally, the beautiful is a two-fold reality: the inner beauty and exterior beauty. Inner beauty 
refers to good conduct; exterior beauty refers to physical attractiveness. A person or thing is 
judged beautiful if and only if it reflects both aspects; for the absence of one nullifies the other. 
This means that beauty in an African context is complementary in the sense that good conduct 
must complement physical attractiveness and vice versa in order to render an aesthetical 
appearance complete, because both aspects are relevant to valid aesthetic judgment.    
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